浮云路 From Fuyun Rd

又被我google到一篇。。看样子没办法不认识你。。。。

你好，看你的文字很多涉及到建筑，你也是学建筑的么？我在同济学建筑的，很喜欢你的东西。

巴赫金谈起过写小说讲故事就像掀开瓦片往私密空间探索，既是“私”“我”又是“公开”的。

HUSSERL认为主体间性的必然性内在于个体对时间和空间的体验方式,SUBJECTS 必须是INTERSUBJECTIVE地存在. 他对身体的两种解说,可能对你对"主体"和空间关系的理解有帮助. 但德国人可厌的是写到高兴就云山雾罩, 我们没事不要绕进去,看看能引两句玩就不错. 这个来自一篇论文:

http://www.beloit.edu/~philorel/faculty/davidvessey/DVSPEPIIFinal.html



＂The motivation for the need for an account of the awareness of others changed over the course of Husserl's career, and with it subtly changed the account. In 1910/11 the concern was with problems raised by the apparent solipsism of the phenomenological reduction. Specifically he was concerned with how to adequately represent another subject to transcendental consciousness as well as how to insure that the constitutional achievements of all subjects converge on the objective world. These two problems make up the project of the "acquisition of the phenomenological monadic-plurality."8 The description of the awareness of others requires two distinctions, both appearing for the first time shortly before the 1910/11 lectures. The first is the distinction between the body as a living organism-a Leib-and the body as a physical thing-a Körper, (though in the lectures he refers to it simply as a Ding, a thing). We first perceive ourselves embodied as a living organism, while we first perceive others as a physical bodies. The second distinction is between presentation and appresentation. Concomitant with the direct "absolute givenness" of the object there is given a horizon-or, as he calls it in the 1910/11 lectures, a "halo"- of non-absolute givenness which can itself be brought under the scope of phenomenological investigation through a "double phenomenological reduction." The second reduction, contained within the first reduction, makes present intentional content which is implicated and contained in the first reduction, but not manifested there as present. Through this expansion Husserl is able to claim that the other as subject-or more specifically the other's body not merely as a thing but as a living organism-is empathicly given to the transcendental ego in the presentation of the other's body, and is given within the phenomenological reduction.



At this point the ego can understand itself as a possible object for another ego-as a person among other persons all intersubjectively constituting (as well as belonging to) the objective world. In this respect it makes sense for Husserl to say that the world arises through other egos.



Empathy is the mirroring of each consciousness in each other, and the possibility of such "mirroring" depends on the possibility of a corresponding constitution of a spatio-temporal nature, of an index extended into all egos.9＂

R has intricate ties to Husserl, who has a philosophy of sound/melody that translates into a philosophy of memory/narration. "If everything we experience is actually present in the now, then either we could only hear one tone at a time, and so never hear a melody, or else we must hear the one note while recollecting the previous sequence. But recollection cannot solve our problem here. Imagine a conductor who asked you to recollect say, three note, and then played the fourth! Clearly this would not be the experience of a melody. Alternatively, if the conductor had no faith in your ability at retention and tried to solve the problem by playing all four notes at the same time, you would still not hear the melody. That is, the retained notes are neither actually present in the same mode as the current note, nor are they recollected. The experience cannot be adequately described as the addition to the actually present note of something else which is actually present, either another sounding note or another recollected note.



The previous notes which are retained are the self-same notes that we previously heard. I don't mean that they are copies of them, reproductions of them or representations of them. I mean that it is exactly the same note which was once sounding which is now experienced as present although past, indeed present as past.



The current note sinks into the past and is modified in this temporal fashion. It is now experienced as that past note which when it was current followed the previous note which is now the further-past, that which was already past when the previous note was actual. The retained past is not just homogenous, it has a layered structure with each phase being experienced as the past of another past. In a four note tune, when the fourth note is current, the second note is experienced not just as past, like the third note, but as the third note's immediate past.



Each note in a melody and each word in a sentence are, of course, themselves enduring, temporal objects in their own right, with a beginning, a middle and an end, and these phases need to be described in a similar manner. The whole note runs off as a unity, but it is the unity of a continuum, for even in the past the note never becomes a static object. Every retained now is a retention of previous nows, and each new moment is a modification of all of the previous retentions. Each note is a running-off continuum. A melody, as a continuum of notes, is then a continuum of continua. Time itself is, as Husserl puts it, "a continuum of continua." As we experience time in consciousness, it is a continual sinking-away, not a series of discrete points, although it is difficult for us to avoid this false impression when we try to put the phenomenon into words. There is a privileged point, the now, but consciousness is not restricted to this point; it embraces the whole articulated temporal structure. Indeed, if consciousness were not temporal in this way experience would not be possible, as Plato already realized in the Philebus.

Time is part of the essence of consciousness. And time is essentially the temporal structure we have described above. It runs off continuous with the previous nows getting further and further "away" until they fade off into the distance. Distant past retentions draw together as in a spatial perspective. This fading away is not a changing of the phase and its nature: a middle C is still a real, sounding middle C, not an imagined, conceptualized or recollected one, but is modified in its mode of givenness so that it is given as the past of the current now.



Husserl claims that any retained moment had to originally have been a now at some stage. In a complementary fashion, a now is always the limit of a retentional series, a boundary edge. We couldn't have a now without retention and protention, nor vice versa. "

above is an exegesis of:

Lectures on The Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness (1928),

很高興你能分享研究當作文獻資料，讓我這離學術深究越來越遠的粗人沾染一點芝蘭之氣。多謝多謝。